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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NEVADA TRAILER FINANCE 
COMPANY, INC. 
and 




STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 




Brief of Respondent 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts as set forth in Appellant's 
Brief appear to us to be over-simplified and in some 
respects incomplete. We desire, therefore, to restate 
the facts with some elaboration of certain facts which 
we deem highly pertinent to this case. 
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The Idaho Trailer Finance Corpany was incorpor-
ated in the State of Idaho in the year 1951. The Nevada 
Trailer Finance Company was incorporated in the State 
of Nevada in the year 1951. The object and purpose of 
both finance companies was and is to purchase condi-
tional sales contracts from the sellers of house trailers 
with sales agencies in the states of Idaho and Nevada. 
After purchasing the contracts, the finance companies 
held most of them, collected the principal and interest 
due thereon from the obligors and ultimately realized a 
profit. The same facts apply generally to both companies 
with the exception that the Idaho company purchased 
contracts from Idaho house trailer dealers and the 
Nevada company purchased its contracts from X evada 
house trailer dealers. The only other difference appears 
to be that in the case of the N"evada company, a bank 
account was maintained in its name in a Las Vegas bank 
during part of the period involved herein. All of the 
banking for the Idaho company appears to ha'e been 
transacted through a Salt Lake City bank. 
The conditional sales contracts purchased by the 
finance companies are represented by Tax Commission 
Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2. (Tr. 46) These contracts were 
executed by the purchasers of the trailers and the sellers 
of the trailers located outside of the state of Utah. 
Later, the seller of the trailer assigned his contracts to 
the finance company and forwarded them to the office 
of the company which is located at 76 East Second South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. (Tr. 48) Here the contracts were 
inspected by Mr. Max Siegel, Manager of the companies, 
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who thereupon issued a check to the seller of the trailer 
in payment for the contract. ( Tr. 69-70) 
The Commission does not concur with Appellants 
1n their contention that the acceptance by the finance 
companies of the assigned contracts takes place outside 
the State of Utah. Under the facts of this case, in order 
for the finance companies to accept these contracts out-
side the state of Utah, the seller of the trailer, whom 
taxpayers claim as their agent, would first have to 
execute the contract as the trailer sales agency with the 
purchaser of the trailer, then assign the contract to the 
finance companies, then accept the assignment on behalf 
of the finance companies and then mail it to the finance 
companies in Salt Lake City. Mr. Siegel's statements, 
although somewhat contradictory, indicate that there is 
an acceptance of the contracts when received in finance 
offices, inspected by him, and a check issued in payment 
thereof in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Tr. 25, 38, and 69) 
As previously stated, the original copies of the con-
ditional sales contracts are sent to the companies' offices 
in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 78) Account cards on all con-
tracts are made up by the office help in said office and 
thereafter the original contracts are retained in a safe 
deposit box in a Salt Lake City bank. (Tr. 48 and 69) 
Monthly installment payments are sent to the company 
offices in Salt Lake. (Tr. 49 and 50) Some payments 
are received at the office of the trailer selling agencies 
or a bank in Las Vegas. In either case, the money and 
record of payment is forwarded to the companies' offices 
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in Salt Lake City where the posting to the account cards 
is made. (Tr. 50) Sizeable bank accounts are maintained 
by both companies in Salt Lake City banks, to which 
sizeable deposits are made almost daily and upon which 
checks are drawn by the companies almost daily. (T.C. 
Ex. 3 and 4) The muniments of title on the trailers are 
retained by the companies in Utah as security until the 
contract is paid out. (Tr. 72) Correspondence to contract 
obligors is sent from the Salt Lake City office of the 
corporations. (Tr. 50) The relationship of the corpora-
tions to Utah and the other activities of these corpora-
tions in Utah includes such things as: 
1. The directors, officers and manager of the cor-
porations are Utah residents and maintain offices 
in Utah. (Tr. 13) 
2. Directors' meetings are held in Utah. (Tr. 13) 
3. Some contracts are discounted in Utah by the 
corporations to Utah banks. (Tr. 35) 
4. The corporations borrow money in Utah. (Tr. 
65) 
5. The corporations retain legal counsel and audi-
tors in Utah for auditing corporation books and 
acting in advisory capacity to the corporations' 
management. (Tr. 76) 
6. The corporation books are maintained and 
kept in Utah. (Tr. 77) (T.C. Ex. 5) 
7. For the pridlege of having their offices at 76 
East Second South, Salt Lake City, Utah, the cor-
porations paid a prorated share of the office ex-
pense which included such items as office help, 
rent, telephone and other miscellaneous expense. 
(Tr. 62 and 63) The deductions taken by the cor-
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
porations for their expense incurred almost en-
tirely in the state of Utah are as follows: 
Idaho Trailer 1951 
Finance Company ------------$1,200.00 
Nevada Trailer 




8. In addition, a single salary was paid by the 
corporations during 1951 and 1952. This salary 
was for the sum of $5,000 which was paid by the 
Idaho Trailer Finance Company to Mr. Max 
Siegel, Manager of the corporations with offices 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Tr. 65) 
It should be noted that neither of these corporations 
maintain offices outside Utah. Neither of the corpora-
tions have employees outside the State of Utah and 
neither of the corporations own real or tangible personal 
property situated outside the state of Utah. (Tr. 30) 
l\Ir. Siegel stated in the record that some directors' meet-
ings had been held in Las Vegas, that he made occasional 
trips to Idaho and Nevada, and that some payments by 
the obligors on the contracts had been received at the 
trailer sales office in Nevada or in a Nevada bank or at 
the office of the Shady Lane Trailer Sales in Idaho. 
Under these facts the Commission has found that 
the Idaho Trailer Finance Company and the Nevada 
Trailer Finance Company were doing business in the 
state of Utah during the taxable years 1951 and 1952, 
and based upon such facts a deficiency for Utah corpora-
tion franchise and privilege tax was assessed against 
said corporations in accordance with the statutes and 
regulations of this state. 
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POINT I. 
THE FOREIGN CORPORATIONS HEREIN ARE COR-
PORATIONS ENGAGED IN AN INVESTMENT TYPE 
BUSINESS CONSISTING OF THE PURCHASING OF 
CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACTS AND SAID COR-
PORATIONS WERE DOING BUSINESS IN THE STATE 
OF UTAH DURING 1951 AND 1952 IN CONTEMPLA-
TION OF THE UTAH CORPORATION FRANCHISE 
TAX LAW. 
Section 59-13-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, (for-
merly 80-13-3 U.C.A. 1943) provides: 
"Every bank or corporation ... for the priYi-
lege of exercising its corporate franchise or for 
the privilege of doing business in the state shall 
annually pay to the state a tax ... " 
The term ''doing business'' has been defined in our 
law and "includes any transaction or transactions in the 
course of its business by a foreign corporation qualified 
to do or doing intrastate business in this state.'' Section 
59-13-1 (5) Utah Code Annotated 1953 (formerly Sec. 
80-13-1 (5) U.C.A. 1943). 
The above statutes give to the state of Utah the 
necessary authority to assess a franchise tax provided 
that a taxable incident exists in the state, which would 
constitute the doing of business in the state by the cor-
poration. 
The definition of what constitutes doing business 
varies depending upon the context in which it is used. 
In this instance we are dealing with corporations engaged 
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in an investment type business. Little can be gained from 
a discussion of cases relating to a different set of facts 
from those presented here. On the question of what 
acts by a corporation constitute doing business our state 
laws and regulations provide: 
Regulation No. 8, Utah Corporation Franchise 
Tax Regulations 
April 15, 1945. 
''To determine the portion of net income 
assignable to business done in the State of Utah, 
for the purpose of fixing the corporation franchise 
tax payable by corporations doing business in the 
state of Utah, it is necessary, according to the 
provisions of Section 80-13-21, U.C.A. 1943 to 
allocate directly certain income. Subsections (1) 
and (3) of this section read as follows: 
" '(1) Rents, interest and dividends derived 
from business done outside this state less related 
expenses shall not be allocated to this state.' 
" '(3) Rents, interest and dividends derived 
from business done in this state less related ex-
penses shall be allocated to this state.' 
''These two subsections allocate directly to 
Utah all rental, interest or dividend income de-
rived from business done in the State of Utah by 
the taxpaying corporation. 
"Where a corporation's business consists in in-
vesting money in rental properties, loans or se-
curities, and in receiving income from such invest-
ments, the business which gives rise to this income 
is considered to be done in the state where the 
investment activities take place. Thus, where a 
corporation received income from rental proper-
ties, or from security investments, the business 
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giving rise to this income is considered to be done 
in the state where the corporation maintains its 
chief place of business, holds its directors' meet-
ings, maintains its bank account, keeps its books 
and muniments of title, pays its salaries, collects 
its rents, and carries out all other activities inci-
dent to its investment business. If these activities 
are distributed throughout several states, then the 
business is considered to be done in the state 
where the most important activities take place. 
''Where a corporation (foreign or domestic) 
has its chief place of business in Utah, there is a 
strong presumption that all rental, interest or 
dividend income derived from its business activi-
ties is allocable directly to Utah. This presump-
tion can only be rebutted by the taxpayer's making 
a positive showing that a substantial portion of 
the business factors discussed above were physic-
ally located outside the State of Utah. If, after 
applying the above tests, it cannot be ascertained 
that rents, interest and dividends are derived 
from business done in any particular state, it will 
be presumed that such income is derived from 
business done in the state of incorporation.'' 
The case of American lntesfment Corporation rs. 
State Tax Commission, et al., 101 Ut. 191, 120 P. 2d 
331 ( 1941), was one of our Supreme Court's first pro-
nouncements on the question of allocating inYestment 
type income under our Franchise Tax Act. In that case 
the court looked to the place where the corporation pay-
ing the dividend did business as being the place where 
the income from such intangibles should be allocated, 
rather than looking to the place where the taxpaying 
corporation carried on its inYestment actiYities. Follow-
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ing this case our Supreme Court in J. M. & M. S. Brown-
ing Co., et al. vs. State Tax Commission, 107 Ut. 457, 153 
P. 2d 993 (1945) reconsidered its previous ruling in 
the American Investment case and expressly overruled 
it. In the Browning opinion the court stated that unless 
it were made to appear that the petitioner was also con-
ducting an investment business (doing business) in an-
other state, all of its net income from its investment 
business done would be correctly allocated to Utah. The 
court in that case noted that the corporation maintained 
no offices in connection with its investment business 
other than its offices in Utah. All the activities in con-
nection with investments were managed from that office 
and its accounts were kept there. 
In this connection the activities of the Idaho Trailer 
Finance Co. and the Nevada Trailer Finance Co. in Utah 
afford an equally persuasive set of facts to support the 
finding that the corporations were doing business in 
Utah in 1951 and 1952. To begin with, neither of the 
corporations maintained offices or hired any employees 
outside the state of Utah. The most that can be said 
for their activities outside Utah is that they maintained 
a bank account in a Las Vegas bank during part of the 
period involved herein, and that Mr. Siegel made occa-
sional trips to confer with the trailer dealers in the 
other states. There is also Mr. Siegel's statement that 
some directors' meetings had been held in Las Vegas. 
On the other hand, the activities of the corporations in 
l' tah consisted of acts ordinarily performed by invest-
ment companies doing business in Utah. These include 
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such activities as maintaining offices in Utah, having 
its management permanently located and residing in 
Utah, keeping the books for the corporation in Utah; 
maintaining bank accounts in Utah; holding directors' 
meetings in Utah; retaining original copies of contracts 
in Salt Lake City office and banks; retaining in Utah 
titles to trailers as security; receiving contract payments 
in Utah; discounting contracts with Utah banks; accept-
ing assignment of contracts; hiring legal services; hiring 
professional accountants; corresponding with obligors 
on contracts ; borrowing money in Utah and paying a 
proportionate share of stenographic expense, telephone, 
rent, etc. 
By comparing the activities of the corporations in 
Utah with the activities of the corporations outside Utah, 
and keeping in mind that we are dealing with inYestment 
type businesses, it is difficult to understand how, by any 
stretch of the imagination, these corporations are doing 
business or carrying on their businesses other than in 
the state of Utah. 
The case of Emerald Oil Company vs. State Tax 
Commission, 1 Ut. 2d 379, 267 P. 2d 27~ (1954) dealt 
with a domestic corporation leasing oil lands in Colorado. 
The Emerald Oil Company held title to the oil lands in 
Colorado, paid a corporation tax in Colorado, had a 
process agc·nt there and its officers frequently made trips 
to the Colorado lands to Yerify and measure all oil pro-
du<'ed and to compare the barrels of oil shipped from 
the field with barrels of oil received by the refinery; to 
< ldermine if the lessee was drilling its quota of wells; 
10 
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to determine location, depth and quality of wells drilled; 
to determine location of the telephone line route and 
condition of the warehouse, possible trespassing, and to 
confer with certain Colorado authorities on tax prob-
lems. Nevertheless, the court weighed these activities in 
Colorado with the activities of the corporation in Utah 
and concluded that the corporation was doing business 
in Utah so as to require allocation of its entire net income 
to Utah for the purpose of computing its franchise tax. 
In sustaining the Tax Commission's decision in that case 
our Supreme Court stated: 
''At Vernal the following business activities 
took place : ( 1) All directors' meetings, (normally 
monthly) were held in the Uintah State Bank. 
(2) All expenses were paid from the Uintah State 
Bank. ( 3) Dividends were distributed from V er-
nal. ( 4) The corporation banked in Vernal. ( 5) 
The corporate books, muniments of title and the 
leases with Equity Oil Company were kept in 
Vernal. ( 6) Policy discussions were held in V er-
nal at the regular meetings of the board of direc-
tors. (7) All royalty receipts were received at 
Vernal. (8) Both leases with Equity Oil Company 
were executed at Vernal. (9) Correspondence, 
management, and clerical activities connected with 
the leases were normally conducted in or from 
Vernal. All of the aforestated activities have re-
ceived some recognition as factors to be consid-
ered in determining the location of 'business done.' 
See C.C.H. State Tax Reporter, New York, Book 
1, Section 5-109. See also Utah State Tax Com-
mission Corporation Franchise Tax Regulation 
Number 8 of April15, 1945. We are of the opinion 
that the nature and extent of the activities of 
Emerald Oil Company in Utah, coupled with their 
11 
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continuity, frequency, and regularity, compared 
with its activities in Colorado adequately sustain 
the decision of the State Tax Commission.'' 
The case of Commonwealth vs . .American Gas Com-
pany, 352 Penn. 113, 42 A. 2d 161, presents a situation 
similar to this one. In that case the court held that a 
foreign subsidiary public utilities holding corporation, 
holding directors' meetings, keeping its securities in 
bank deposit vaults, receiving and depositing dividends, 
renting offices and in general conducting its authorized 
business in the commonwealth was engaged in doing 
business therein within the Franchise Tax Act, and that 
the fact that its business involved dealing in intangibles 
rather than tangibles does not relieve it from its just 
share of the tax burden. 
It is the Commission's contention that said cases 
sustain the position of the Tax Commission and that 
within the contemplation of the Utah Corporation Fran-
chise Tax Act the Idaho Trailer Finance Company and 
the Nevada Trailer Finance Company were legally doing 
business in the state of Utah. 
POINT II 
THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE CORPORATIONS OUT-
SIDE THE STATE OF UTAH ARE COMPARABLE TO 
THE ACTIVITIES IN UTAH OF MANY INVESTMENT 
CORPORATIONS WHOSE ACTIVITIES IN UTAH DO 
NOT CONSTITUTE THE DOING OF BUSINESS IN CON-
TEMPLATION OF THE UTAH CORPORATION FRAN-
CHISE TAX LAW. 
Appellants haYe stated in their brief that if the ac-
tivities of the corporations in these cases were re,·ersed 
12 
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so that what was done in the states of Idaho and Nevada 
was being done in Utah, and what was done in the state 
of Utah was being done in the states of Idaho and 
Nevada, the Tax Commission would assess a tax on all 
the corporations' income. The Tax Commission does not 
agree with the appellants on this point. The J. M. d!; M. 8. 
Browning case, supra, applied a test for determining 
where the income of an investment type corporation 
should be allocated for franchise tax purposes. The court 
held: 
''The test as to whether a corporation is doing 
business in states other than Utah under par-
ticular fact situations would therefore be: Would 
such conduct is carried on in Utah be held to 
constitute doing business so as to subject the cor-
poration to the Utah Corporate Franchise Tax.'' 
The activities of these corporations in Idaho and 
Nevada closely parallel the activities in Utah of many 
foreign corporations which purchase :first mortgages from 
mortgage loan companies in the state of Utah. Although 
the Supreme Court has never construed our statute in 
this regard, the administrative interpretation by the Tax 
Commission has been that they were not doing business 
in contemplation of our franchise tax act. Legal counsel 
has advised the purchasing companies that they were 
not doing business in the state of Utah. In some cases 
the corporations have been advised by their legal counsel 
to qualify under the Utah foreign corporation act so as 
not to jeopardize their right to sue, but said corporations 
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Although the case of G.M.A.C. vs. Lund, 60 Ut. 247, 
208 Pac. 502 (1922) dealt with the question of the right 
to sue, nevertheless our court held under a similar set 
of facts that: 
''The mere act of accepting an assignment of 
an obligation against a citizen of this state is not 
doing business within the contemplation of the 
law." 
This same result was later reached in the case of 
Anglo-California Trust Company t~s. Hall, 61 Ut. 223, 
211 Pac. 991 ( 1922). 
Although there may not be complete uniformity in 
the methods of operation in Utah by financing institu-
tions who purchase mortgages from sources in Utah, 
their activities are substantially the same, and the Com-
mission maintains that in assessing the tax herein it has 
followed a consistent and equitable policy with respect 
to the taxation of this type of financing corporation. 
ANSWER TO TAXPAYERS' .A.RGr:JIEXT 
Appellants' arguments in Point 1 of their brief have 
been answered in Points I and II of Tax Commission's 
Brief. 
Appellants appear to be taking somewhat of a con-
tradictory stand in Point II of their brief. They cite the 
Utah statute giving the state of Utah the power to tax 
a corporation doing business in the state, even though 
not qualified. Later they take the position that even if 
14 
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they are doing business, they cannot be taxed by the 
state of Utah because what they are doing in Utah is 
unlawful, since they are not qualified, and the state 
cannot grant a privilege for doing business unlawfully. 
The difficulty with this position is that no corporation 
would qualify to do business in Utah if it could avoid 
paying taxes by refusing to qualify here as a for-
eign corporation. While this argument was not advanced 
by the plaintiffs in the recent case of Riley Stoker Cor-
pora.tion vs. State Tax Commission, 3 Ut. 2d 164 (1955), 
the holding of the case clearly indicates that such a posi-
tion would be completely untenable if the corporation 
is actually doing business in the state of Utah within the 
contemplation of our law. 
The case of People vs. Tropical Fruit Corp., 223 App. 
Div. 864, 228 N.Y. Supp. 189, Aff'd., 252 N.Y. 605, 170 
N. E. 160, expresses what we consider to be a fair reply 
to this argument: 
''A foreign corporation doing business in the 
state is liable for license tax regardless of whether 
it has obtained a certificate authorizing it to do 
business in this state required by the stock cor-
poration law. The corporation should obtain no 
advantage over other foreign corporations legally 
doing business in the state by failing to comply 
with the laws of the state.'' 
Appellants quote the case of First Security Corpora-
tion of Ogden vs. State Tax Commission, 91 Utah 101, 63 
P. 2d 1062 (1937), as sustaining their position. We feel 
that the soundness of this case stands on shaky grounds 
inasmuch as the A me ric an Investment case, supra, which 
15 
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relied upon the First Security case was expressly over-
ruled in the J. M. & lll. S. Browning case, supra. Fur-
thermore, the facts in this case differ greatly from those 
in the First Security Bank case, supra. It was not shown 
that the Wyoming corporation involved in the First 
Security B an.k case was doing business in Utah. Instead, 
it was a case wherein a Utah holding corporation held 
all the stock of the Wyoming corporation. As previously 
stated in this brief, our Supreme Court, prior to the J. M. 
& M.S. Browning case, supra, looked to the place where 
the corporation who paid the dividend did business as 
being the place of doing business for franchise tax pur-
poses. In the J. M. & M. S. Browning case, supra, the 
court looked instead to the place where the investment 
company did business for purposes of determining where 
the net income should be assigned for franchise tax 
purposes. 
The Tax Commission does not claim that it is within 
its province to require corporations to qualify in Utah 
as foreign corporations. The laws of this state require 
that foreign corporations doing business in Utah shall 
qualify and pay a tax for the privilege of doing business. 
Other state agenries are responsible for imposing a 
penalty for failure to qualify; it is the Tax Commission's 
duty to collect the franchise tax. 
Appellants maintain that all their business is carried 
on outside the state of Utah, and then go on to say that 
at most their netiYities in Utah are incidental to an inter-
state busiHPSS and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of 
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the state of Utah. The Commission contends that inter-
state commerce does not afford the corporations a taxable 
immunity in this case. Although the corporations herein 
were incorporated in the states of Idaho and Nevada, 
the evidence indicates that they actually function and 
conduct their business in the state of Utah. Furthermore, 
it is difficult to see how an investment type business 
would not be at least remotely connected with interstate 
transactions. A corporation with principal place of 
business in the state of Massachusetts could undoubtedly 
purchase stocks and bonds from sources in many places 
in the 48 states. The dividend payments, interest on 
bonds, the stock certificates and other indicia of owner-
ship would likely be sent to the corporation's offices in 
Massachusetts. If a franchise tax based on such income 
is to be regarded as a burden on interstate commerce 
then it is difficult to imagine a corporation that could not 
steer its activities down the narrow road between inter-
state and intrastate commerce and thus avoid the pay-
ment of a tax in any state. If appellants are not doing 
business in Utah so as to be subject to the Utah Franchise 
Tax, it is difficult to see where they are doing business. 
In the case of Champion Copper Compa;ny v. ill assa-
chusetts, 246 U.S. 155, 62 L. Ed. 637, 38 S. Ct. 295 (1916), 
a ~Iichigan corporation maintained an office in Boston 
pursuant to a provision in its Articles of Association. 
The proceeds of its business in Michigan were deposited 
in Boston banks and, after paying salaries and expenses, 
were distributed as dividends from the Boston Office. 
Directors' meetings were held frequently during each 
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year at the Boston Office, at which meetings reports from 
the Treasurer and General Manager were received. 
Dividends were voted, officers were elected and other cor-
porate duties were discharged. The Supreme Court held: 
"These corporate activities in Massachusetts 
are not interstate commerce and may be made the 
basis of an excise tax by that state. '' 
Substantially all the activities which took place in 
the above mentioned case have also taken place in Utah 
by the corporations now before us, plus additional ac-
tivity, such as borrowing money in Utah and discounting 
conditional sales contracts with Utah banks. On the basis 
of the above case and the facts herein, the required 
taxable incident for taxation by the state of Utah Is 
present and does not burden interstate commerce. 
The last point made by appellants is that the local 
incidents of internal management are unrelated to any 
business done in the state and, therefore, do not provide 
a basis for a tax. We believe that a comparison of the 
facts in the cases cited by appellants satisfactorily dis-
tinguishes them from the present case. 
The court in Iowa Limestone 'VS. Cook County, 223 
N. W. 682 (cited by appellants) construes a statute which 
assesses a county tax on the shares of stock of a cor-
poration at the place where its principal business is tra;ns-
acted. Upon making a comparison of the activities of the 
corporation in Des Moines, Cook County, with the ac-
tivities at Alden, the court concluded that the principal 
business of the corporation was transacted at Alden. But 
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it did not say that no business was transacted at Des 
).foines. Under the facts of the present case it is diffi-
cult to see how the appellants could contend that no 
business was transacted in Utah when in fact the prin-
cipal place of business appears to have been Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The case of Miller Brewing Co. vs. Capitol, 
72 P. 2d 1056, was a "right to sue" case and involved 
only the execution of a single guarantee of payment in 
the state of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted by counsel for the Com-
mission that under the law and facts, the Idaho Trailer 
Finance Company and the Nevada Trailer Finance Com-
pany were clearly doing business in the state of Utah 
during the years 1951 and 1952. We further submit that 
by comparison, the position of the Commission in this 
matter has been consistent and fair with respect to the 
treatment of other corporations and that the Commis-
sion's determination that the corporations herein are 
obligated to pay an equitable franchise tax to the State 
of Utah should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
REX W. HARDY 
BEN E. RAWLINGS 
JOHN G. MARSHALL 
Counsel for Respondent 
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